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CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES

in
CONPACTS OF

SALE

The question as to whena stipulation in a contract
is

a condition and when a warranty has given rise to con-

sideralle confusion and misapprehension.

The authorities

pon this poin8 are nmereus and not always harmonious.
My purpose is to collate and discuss the principal Unglish cases, to set out, if possible, what the law is and
to ploint out some of its inconsistencies.

Perhaps I

can best point out the distinction in effect between a
condition and a warranty,

and alse,, incidentally how the

question may arise, bl! quoting from the opinion of Lep

in'Be4n v. Burness, 3
'Properly

& S.,
S.

751.

He says,-

sp-aking a representation is a statenent or as-

sertion made by one party to the other

or at the tine

(f the contract of some matter or circumstanco relating
to it.

Though it

instrument it

is sometimes contained in the writtel

is not an integral part of the contract;

and, consequently,

the contract is not broken though the

representation proves to be untrue; nor (with the exception of policies of insurance, at all events maritime

policies, which stand on a peculiar anomalous footing)
is

Isuch untruth any cause of action, nor has it any eff

frauduOac:i whatever unless the representation *"a made
by reason of its

lently, either
of its

being made with knowledge

untruth, or by reason of its

being ma4e

ly, with a recklesa ignorance of whether it
untrue.

Representations

if

honest-

was true or

are not usually contained in

th

the written instrument of dontraot yet they some times
are.

But it,

not alter their

is

plain that their insertion threrin canThe quedtion however may arise,

nature.

whether a desorlptive statement in a written inatrument
is

a mere representation or whether it

part of the centract.

is

a substantive

This Is a question of construe-

tion which the court and not the jury must determins.
If

the court should come to the conclusion that such a

statement by one party was intended to be a substantive
part of the contract and not a mere representation,

the

oft-discussed question may of course" be raised whether
this part of the contract

is

a condition precedent,

or

only an independedt agreement a breach of which will not
Justify a repudiation of the *ontract but will only be a
cause of action for a oampensation in

damages'.

A dstination

in effect, between a condition prece-

dent and an indeperzent agreement or warranty is here
pointed out, namely, the breach of a condition gives the
promi.tee a right. to repudiate the whole contract, while
the breach of a warranty does not release him from his
o ntract but is only ground* for an action for damages.
How are we to distinguish between those statements or representations which are conditions and those which are independint agreements or wafranties.
Considerable uncertainty and obscurity is caused on
this point by the unfortunate use of the word warranty.
Aseon gives five senses In which this word has been used.
It

is

not necessary te enumerate

quotation from the opinion of
case will

them here but another
A

.

-r^ n the above

serve as an example of the many senses in

which this word is used.

At one place he says;-

the court shoul 4 *Onp to the

'ZI

conclusion that such a

statem-,nt by one party was intended to be a substantive
part of his iontract, and not a mre representation,

the

oft-discussed question may, of course be raised, whethe&
this prt Uf the contract is a ocndition precedent
Zy an independent

agreeret.

And again-- *If

or on-1-

such do-

ecripttga

statement was intended to be a substantive

part of the contract it is to be regarded as a warranty
that is to say, a condition on the failure or nonperformance of which the other party may, if he is so minded,
repudiate the contract in toto.

If, indeed, he has re-

ceived the whole, or any substantial part of the consider
at ion *4t-h--&Apromise

on his part the warranty loses the

character of : or ndition, or, to speak perhaps more properl,,

ceases to be available as a condition and beeon es a

warranty in the narrower sense of the word, viz., a, stipniation by way of agreement for the breach of which the
compensatinn may be sought in damages".
In the above quotations it will be observed that the
word warranty is given at least three distinct meanings
and condition end warranty are used as synonymous terms.

I shall use the word warranty asmeaning an independent
sibsidiary promise, collateral to the rnin object of the
contract.

This is the use of the word adopted by Sir

William .nson.
In

(See Ansonon Contracts,

Par- 295 N.

the earlier cases upon this subject

1).

the coutts do

not seem to- have considered the intention ef the parties
as being of any importance whatever,

Theit decisions

are based upon a narrow and teOhniel const'uotiOn of the
Thtas in 15 Henry VII.

language of the instriuefnt.
P1.

17,

it

was ruled by Fineu=

C. J.,

that if

10

one Oove-

nant with me to serve me for a Mear, and I covenant with
him to give him twenty pounds if

I do not aay,

for the

cause aforesaid he shall have an action fo$r the twenty
pounds although he never serv-'s me; otherwise it is if I
say that ho shall haie twenty pounds for the cause aforesaid.

lo,

if

I

eovenant with a man that t will marry

his daughter and he covenants with me that he will make
an estat- to me and hiisdughter,
two bodies begotten,

if

and the heirs of our

I afterwardg marry another woman,

or his daughter marries another man,

yet I shall have an

action of covenant against him'to compel him to make the
estate; but if

the covenant wete that he waald make the

estate to us two forthe cause aforesaid, in that case he
wo Ild not mane the estate until we were married.
In later oases the rule has been established that
the dependo_

or iodependelig of covenants is to be Col-

lected from the evident sense and meaning of t-e parties.
(See per Lord Mansfield,

684 -

in

Jones v, Varelay, 2 Doug.,

691).
T1is is the rule by which the courts are now govern-

ed in deciding such question:i.
D.,

In

l8Zs).
it

or other,

theory it

is

very difficult

is

(Bettini v.

Gye,,l Q. B.

for some reason

simple but,

of application.

Mr. Lenjamin gives five rules for discovering this
(3ee

intention.
04t.
the day is

Where a day i

562).

appointed for doing any act and

to happed or may happen before the promise by

the other party is

aliter,

rerformance,

if

the latter

to be performed,

action before performance,
eadent;

Par.

Benjamin on Sales,

which is

the day fixed is

my bring

not a ctndition preto happen after the
is

for then the performance

deemed to be a

condition precedent.
2nd.

When a covenant

or promise goes only to part

of the consideration and a breach of it

may be piid for

in damages it is an independent covenant not a condition.
3rd.

Where the mutual promises go to the whole con-

sideration on both sides they are mutu~l conditions precedent formerly called dependent conditions.
4C.h.

Where each party is to do an act at the same

time as the other,

as where goods

in

a sale for cash are

to be delivered by the vendor, and the price to be paid
by the buyer,

these are concurrent conditions and neither

party can maintain an action for breach of contract with-

Out averrkng that he performed or offered to perform
wh:-t he himself was bound to do.
Whe-e from the considoration of the whole in-

5th.
strLnent

it

is

Clear that the one part y relied upon his

remedy, and not upon the perforrmnse of his condition by
the other, such a condition &a not a condition precedent.
But if the intention was to rellx upon the performance ofh
the promise and not on the remedy, the performance is

not

a eondition ',reeedent.

These are substantially the rules givenin the not's
to Pordage V. Ole, 14Wm. Saiinders,
also Cutter v. Powleol,
lute, howeVer,

2 S. L. C. 1,

--'./320, Note B.,
They are not abhe-

and if the 4nstrument, when construed ae-

aording to them, disolosesyan intention which is not the
apparent intention of the parties the court will disregard them.,i ,
In Roberts v. Brett,i18 C. B., 551, there was an agreement datd the 15 th of May, by which the plaintiff
0ovenanted fdrthwith to pociure a wessel and stew On %
board a certain telegraphic cable, then at 1orden's
wharf, and to rig,provision and man her, and to have her
ready, for sea at the Nora on or before the 15th of July.
The defendant eovenarnted to pay the plaintiff

#e4-.4-

i5000 by Instalments,- -1

000 seven days after tka ar-

rnVw 1 of theovessel at lhorden's wharves, J2 000 on or before the expiration of twenty one days after the vessel
should have arrived alongside ,.%orden's wharf and tbe remaining 42 000 as soon as she had put to sea from the
Nort,,

nd also to give the plaintiff

tain company,

a cer-

It was also mut' ally agreed that each par-

within ten days after the execution of the a-

ty should,
greement,

500 shares in

give and execut,?oto the other a bond Vith two

sureties in

the sum oft5

000 for the performance of the
In an action upon this agreement

covenants on his part.

the breaches assigned being non-payment b, the defendant
of the five thousand pounds or amypart thereof and nondelivery oftthe shares:
bond by the plaintiff

held,

that the exeeution of the

was a condition precedent to his

right to sue for such breaches.

For the plaintiff

was urged that the Oase came within the first
notes to Portage v.
the 1I

000

aswthe liability

the bond should be given;

in

the

to pay

,-might accrue before the time at which it

stipulated tklt
it .ame

Cole,(slpra),

rule

it

was

and also, that

within the third rule (Mr. Benjamin's

--

rule)

as it was a:,oovenant going only to part of the consideration on both sides a breach of which might be paid for

Jervis,

in darmges-

I am of the opinion that

C. J.:-"

the giving of .- bond by the plaintiff was a condition
to pv
preoedent to the obligation on the defendant's part
If

(5 000 or any part of it.

pay the

we were to act

4
a
simplr on the first rule in Portage v. Co that where

day is

appointed for doing an act,

and the day is

pen or may happen before the thing which is
is

ation for it
pensed with,tiff

to be perforned,

to happ-

the consider-

the condition is

dis-

and were to assume here that the plain-

was bound at once to begin to prepare the vessel,

So that it

was certain that the seven days after her ar-

rival alongside M.1orden's wharf when the first paynnt of

'51,00would be fe

must expive before the lapse of the

period for giving, the bonds,

we Mi;ht feel some diffi-

culty in arriving at the conclusion we have come to.
after all,

that rule only professes to give the result of

the intention of the parties: and where on the whole,
is

apparent that the intention is

done first

it

that that which is to-$&

is not to depend upon the performance of the

thing thAt is

to be done afterwards,

-lying on their remedy,

the parties are re-

nd, not on the performanee of the

eondition; but where you plainly see that it
tention to

But

is

their in-

ely on the Condition, and not on the remedy,

the perory-nde of' the thing is a condition procedentV.
However unsatisfaetory, in some respects, the reathere
soning upon whiah this ease is decided, the rule is
parties
very Olearly laid down that the intention of the
When it can be disoovered is to be the controlling eonsideration and that the rules to Portare & Coikwill not
be decisive where it clearly appears that the parties
contemplated different results.
The 2nd and 3rd of these rules are the most importIn almost every case the question to be decided

ant.

is,

whether the promise goes only Lo part of the consider

ation or whether it

goes to the root of the whole agree-

I propose ncw to examine and discuss the eases

mont.

comirg, under these two rules.
In

ccnsidering whether a propise or stipulation goes

to the whole or only to a part of the consideration it
is necessary.- to take into account the circumstances under
which, and the purpoees for which,

the contract was m:Ae.

A stipulation which might, under ordinary circumstances,
be an inrnaterial

one

iglht under a different condition

of affairs be one of the utr:ostnjnportance.

In Graves

v. Legg, 9 Ex. 709, for instance, the Plaintiffto sell
the defendant a cargo of w ,l and covenanted to deciare

the name of the, vessel as soon as the wool was shipped.
At the triJal it was proved that wobl was an article of
flustuating value and not salable till
ship had been dealared.

tthe -iame of the

It was held that in order to

get at t*e intention of the !arties the co-rt should take
into consideration not only the language of the instrumerit but also the surrounding circumistances arnit

hav-

ing been shown that wool was an article of fluctuating
value and not,,sAlabie until the name of the vessel had
been declared,

taey concluded tlht the stipulation after

declaring the. name of the vessel w-s intended by the parties to be of the essence of the contract.
In examining the cases under these r"ules we will
probably gain nothing by going back of the ca.;e of Boone
v. Eyre,
tiff

1 il. L1.,

273,

.0'ote.

In this case the plain-

conveyed to the defendant the equity of redemption

of a plantation

in the West Indies together with the

stock of negroes thereon in consideration o'1500 and an
annuity of 4160 pounds rer annum for iiis life; and covenant'd thathehad a good title

to the plantation, was

lawfully possessed of the negroes and that the defendant
shoiild q-_ietly enjoy it.
the ilaintiff

The defend-nt covenanted,

well and truly, performing all

and.-ever-

that

thing therein oontained on his ,art to be perforrTd,
Lreach,

the defendaM, would pay the annuity.
paylnent of the anmuity.

Plea,

he

the non-

th-At the ylaintiff was
Ier-llypossissed of

not at t1je time of making -the deed,

the negroes on the plantation and so had not a good title to wonvey.

Held on demurrer th-t the plea was bad.

Lord )-ansfield:-

very clear, wfore

"The distinction is

the mutuial covenants go to the whole (:f the consideration
on both sided they are mutual conditions,
dent to the other.

the one ipece-

Put where they go only to a part,

where a breach may be paid for in dumages,
fendant has a remedy on his covenant,
it- as a condition precedent.
allowed,

If

there the de-

and shall not plead

this rlea were to be

any one negro not being the property of the

plaintiff would bar the action'.
There are several cases whioh, though important,
cannot be classified under ary general heading; these I
give here in the order in which they were decided except
in one or two instances where for Trurposes of comparison
I have found it convenient to depart from the general
scheme .
In Glazebrook v.WOodrow,
tiff

8 T.

Rep.,

36(G the plain-

eovenanted to sell to the defendant a sehool house

and to convey the same to him on or, before th'e first of

AuMust,

1797 and to deliver up the possession to him on

the 24th of June, 1796, ard in consideration thereof defend nt covenanted to pay plaintiff'1120 on or before the
13t of August, 1797.

Defend:nt was put in possession

on June 24th, but plaintiff did not execute any conveyance of property to the defend;-nt.

In an action by the

plaintiff to recover the £120 it wes held t at the covenant to convey, and that for the payrment of t-e money
were dependent conditicns and tl~t the plaintiff could
not r:naintain an action for the 120 without averring that
he had conveyed or tendered a conveyance to the defendC,,I

ant.

It would 3eem as if this ca:-e would come under the
firsit rule as a case where a day is appointed for the doing of an act- and the day is to h: ppen or may happen before, the promise by the other party is
in

which case,

if

that rule were followed,

to be considered an ill-decided case.
p'it sinly

tle

it

wo',1d have

Tie decision is

ipon the ground that the agreemrent to convey

wa.3 a substantive part o-f the contract.
says:-

to be pwrformed,

The very substance

the plaintiff

Lord Kenyon

of the consideration to enti-

to receive the money was the naking of

the conveymnee requires[; and it
not done it;

i3

admitted that ho has

that JrSkes an end of the question.

Mattock v. Kinglake,

10 A.

case some-

isa

In this case, by artie-14

what sim1lar to the one above,
Oles unvder seal,

30,

&-)

and the

the 1plaintiff agreed to sell

The rlaintiff

defendant to purchase certain preii.ies.
covenanted to .:ay,

on o)r before the

)th day,

as consider-

ation for such sale or purchase,

a certain sum and to pay

for the colnveance and stainps.

Held,

ars

was not a condition precedent

with the payment.

The case is

rule to Pofta-e0v.
directley in

Cole (supra)

th.-,t the convey-

to not consurrent

so decided under
and,

it

the lot

seems to me,

conflict with GlazebrDok V.

*s

Woodrow which

the court attempts to di,3tin-uish by saying that

in

that

case both the acts were to be done aL the same time or at
the same

day.

Such,

in

fact

, was not the case

4.
the language used in

From

that

Case it

ptrties clearly contempla ted that

would appear that the
thp payment

might be

before the conveyance.
If

we hold strictly

to the rules of Portage v.

the decision in Mattock v.
Glazebrok v. w odrow,

Xinglake is

wrong,

but id,

right ari

Cole,

that in

on the other hand

of the parwe are to be governed by the real intention
position is
ties, as nearaS it can be got at, then the
just the reverse.
In Stav'3rst. Curling, 3 1ing. N. 0.,

355,

the plain-

tiff as captain of a South Sea whaler, covenanted with
the defendant that he would proceed to the fisiery and
procure a cargo of Sperm oil, or as great a proportion as
might be under all circumstance.,

within his power to obdeliy-

tain; would return to Long;on, and ;t his own cost
ert

he cargo; would obey instruction;

be frugal of pro-

visions and not dispose of any of them without accounting
for the same;

and would not smugglo nor trade nor permit

any on board to do so,

Defendants covenanted "on the

performance of the before mentioned terms and condit ions
on the part of the plaintiff" to lay him a certain proportion o' the net proceeds of the cargo.
plaintiff's covenants wert

Held,

that the

independent and that the per-

formanee of them ,:as not a condition precedent to an act,'-on the defendant's covenant, the court saying, that these
covenants went only to a part of the c onsideration and
that they were more anxious to discover and be governed
by the intention of the parties thar~to follow the strict
and technical form of words used in the agreement.

from the
This would seem to be another departure
Jere a time wus set for

Cole.

1st rule to Porka~e v.

the slaring of the profits

the doing of a aertain act -

other p

was to happen after leAfolnanoe by th,

anit

-

According to that rule a perfornance would be

party.

held a condition preoedent.
The two following cases arising out of somewhat similar circumst',noes and both decided by the same court at
nearly the same time will serve as good illustrations of
the distinction between stipulations going only to a
part of the consideration and those going to the root
agreement.

of tie
ilhq

is

first

Dettni v.

R

L.

1 Q. L.

agreed with the defendant,

Here the plaintiff

tor of an opera compan.y,
theatres,

Gye,

halls and

186.

the direcin

to take the part of klttnor

drawing rooms in

during his engagement,

.,

the United Kingdom

to begin on the 30th of Miarch,

1875 and t3rminate on Lhe 30 of July, 1875, at a salary
of

.150 per month.

withot fail

The plaintiff

agre xi to

e in London

at least six days before the coanaencement

of his engagement, for the p.urpose of rehearsal,
tiff

was not in

Plain-

London six days before the comumenoement

of his engagement

and the defendant

.iought on this ground

HEld, thet the failure of

to repudiate the contract.

the rlaintifito be present for rehorsals was not a breah
of a condition

precedent but merely a breack of an inde-

pendent agreement for which the defend , nt co-ld recover
Blackburn, J:-

compensation in anAetion for damages.

hiie court must acert:kin the intention of the parties,
!is is

said by Park,

the court

in

instrunent
evidence

B.,

Graves v.

in

delivering the Juibment of

Legg,

' to be collected from the

and the circumstances

legally admissible

to which it is to b., construed.'

particular rule well acknowledged,

is

in
'one

He adds:-

that where a cove-

nant or arreemnnt goes to a 1,art of the consideration ol
beth sides and may be comrpensatodin damages it
dependent

covenant

or contract.'

an in-

There was no averment

of any special circumstances existing in
reference

is

to which the agreement

thai case with

,ias made but the cmrt

must look at the genercl nature of such an employmentu.
'he court considering the facts,
ga.e3mqntQ1ifteen weeks)

that this is

to sing in

drawing rooms and corn

certs as well as in the op~era, 'and that the
attnd

a IOng en-

to

f7ilure

rehearsals coL-1d affect only the theatric-l

per-

formanoes for the first week or fortnight, were of oprinion that this did not go to the root of the matter so as
to require them to consider it

a condition pfrecedent.

In

Poussard v,

T. 1 0'. T:.

L.

OIpiers,

.,

410,

the

plaintiff agre d with the defen&Vnts to sing and play in
the chief fe-.'le rart in a new opera, about to be brought
for throe inonths,

out at defendfnt's theatre,
the opera ran for th:t time,
14th of 1Thovember,
..Z$.th

for Gi

f November,

cortrmnain, on or ebout the
.,.as announced

jerforar.nce

The first

provided

and no objection was raised by

the plaintiff as to this deLby.

"he attended several

i-ehearsals, 3such attendance being an impfied part of the
contr3(t,

though not expwessed.

;,ing to delays of the

composer the latter part of the opera was not in the
hands of the defendints until a few days before the 28th

of November -,nd the £inal rehearsal did not take place
till

Plaintiff was ta-

the beginning ,f the last week.

ken ill

and was unabl

that week;

:nd it

mibht continue,

to attend any of the rehearsals in

beirg uncertain how long her illness
defondi.nt's manager mde -,. proisional

engagement with another artisb,

1iss
-- to study the
If she Waa

rart and take it if rlaintiff was unable.
not wanted 14isswas to receive a douceurt
called on to
til

-erform she ..;as to receive

the 25th of December,

if

If she wrs

Sib per week un-

the piAece ran so long

The

plaintiff continued too ill to attend the rehearsals or

the first

performanse on the °2th oif .overrber or the

three following daps.
On tlev

on these days.

accordin ly performed

iviiss I--

well enougih to -erform and tnderedi
the defendant

refuseA to accept,

her services which

on which the plaintiff

brought an action for wron7fu] dismisA*&t.
th- plaintiff"3

went

that

to the root of the matter and

justified the defendont in
"If

Hold,

inability to perform on the opening -md

early performances,

burn J.;

was

the plaintiff

4th ,of gecembei'

rescinding the contract.

no substitute capable of performing

Elaok
e

adequately couild be obtaindd except on the terms th-; t
she shoild be p1r4nently engaged at a h~ghev• pay than
the plaintiff,

in

our opinion it

followi,

law that the failure on the plaintifl's

as -, matter of

part went to the

root oi the matt )r and dischmnaged the defendant.

Sales by Description.

Where goods faile

to answer the description under

which t4ey are sold such fVilure goes to the whole cons~deration and the vendee Is not bound to accept the
goods delivered.

This rule is

so well settled that no

authotities need be cited but it is

difficult in srme

cases to say *hat wil
In Sikephr.1d V.

amount

to a dec2,iptien.

Kain, 5 r.

2.:Ald. 240,

a vessel was

sold as "a copper fastened vessel" but "these terms were
introduced into the agreernent:was all T
whatever".

"The vessel to be taken

lwitout any allowance for any defects
In an action by the vcndee for breach of

warranty, it appeared that the ship, when sold, was only
partially copper fastened and that she was vot what was
known in the *rade as a"copper fastened vessel
8o

.

It al-

appeared that the plaint iff, before.he boutght her,

had a full opportunity to examine her situation.

Held,

that the words "with all faults" must be taken to mean
with all fa~llts which a ship might have consistently
with its being the thing d.escribed.

That here the ship

was not a copper fastened Ship at all and therefore a vea
dIct for the plaintiff

1

,

'iaylor v. Bullen, 5 Ex. 779, a vessel described as

'teak

built",i ias sold 'with all f'ults and ,ithout any

allowance for any ,-efect or error wlatever".
was not teak built.

The vessel

It was held in this case that the

insertion of the word error covered any unintentional

misdeseription so as to shield the vendor in the absence
of fraud, from any responeibility for error in describing

the vessel as teak bnilt.
In Allen v. Lake, 18 Q, E., 580$ it was held that
was not a

a sale of turnip seed as 04krvings vfedos"

sale with a warranty of quality, but with a description
of the article; and that the Oontract waapot satisfied by
the

tender of any other seed than "4kirvings4wedes'.
v, Godts,

In "iol

10 Exch.,

there waj a s'le

191,

of *foreign ref ized rape Ail warranted only %qual to samThe oil tendered corresponded with the samples

plea*-

but the jury found that it
Held,

oil'.
oeive

it

it

refined rape

was not "freign

that the purhaser was not boun4 to re-

not being the article

desoribed.

The sale

by sample had reference only to the quality.
Bannewnan v.

WhIte,

10 C, Bo N. S.t 844.

treaty for the sale of hops (by sample)
er asked thmeseller if

It

the proposed buy-

any sulphur had been used in the

growth or treatment of tl*m,
akk the prie

Upon a

addin"p

that he wo'1d not

sulphur had been used.

The seller

thereupon asserted that no sulphur had been usead.
the hops had been inspected,

veoihed and delivered,

buyer discovered that sulphur had been used in
vat-lon of,.a portion of the hopes-

After
the

the aiclti-

five acres out of

The whole growth, however, vlas so mixed up togeth-

500.

or that it was impossible to seop

Held, that the representation tht

znsulphured hops.

the

ate the sulphured from

no sulphur had been tsed, was a substantivo part of the
contract and that the use of sulphur avoided the cntract.
'Was

-rle, C. J.,

"The questir.n (for the jury) was,

the affirmation that no sulphur had been used in-

tended, between the parties, to be a part of the contract of sale and a warranty by the plaintiff?' and the
jury answer'.d this question in

the affirmative.

fect of this finding of the jury,
is

now to be considered

The ef-

t ken with the evidence

. We avoid the term warranty

because it is used in two senses, and the term condition
because the question is whether that term is applicable.
then the effeot is
plnintiff gave,
used.

T his

tht-2t the defendants required,

-and the

his undert:,king that n, sulphur had been

undertaking was a preliminary stipulation;

and if it had not been given the defendant would not
have gone on
In this

with the treaty which vesulted in the s-le.

sense it was the condition upon which the de-

fendantsacontract3d;

and it

would be contrar;, to the

in-

tentioM exp-essed by this stipulation that the contract
sho ild remin valid if

sulphur had been used.

1he intem

ti,'n of the y arties governs in the

,okir-t" and construc-

If the pirties so intend, the

tion of all contracts.

sale may be absolute, Ilf"^a warranty superadded; or the sa&
may be conditional, tqbe null if the wqrranty be broken.
And upon this statemrent of i acts we think that the intention appear3 that the cont-ract

should be n1l if sul-

phur Lid been used."
In Josl

v. Kingsford,

13 C.

R.

. S.,

447,

sale was of oxalic acid which had been examined
proved and a great part
"ore he discovered the
warrant

Lhe quality,

chenicallj impure,
magnesia,

the

#nM ap-

of it ised by the purohaser beimurities.

On. analysis,

The vendor did not
iL ,-1as found to be

from adultrration ,ith

a defect not visjbl,

to the nke,'

sulph,.te
eye,

Cr

no r

likelyr to be discovered even by an experienced person.
lhere were t o count; in

the declaration,

one for breach

of contract to deliver the moxalic acid", the other for
breach oi

warranty

"LhLtthe rood, were oxalic acid.

Frle, C. J.,

told the jury that there was no evidence of

a werranty,

and th,t the question was,

whether the a r-

ticle d,elivered c:.me under the denomtination of oxalic acid in comnereial languasre.
right.

e Pz'

Held that the dirictirn

was

In Aenmar v. Castella, I. T. 2 C. P., 4Z1, the plaistiff sold cotton to the defendant through a broker under
the following contract:-

"Sold by order and for account

to Messrs A. Castella & Co.,
D C
121 bales at 25 d. per
the following cotton, viz., C
pound expected to arrive in London per Cheviot from- Madof A

rM.

J7. C. Axemar, & Co.,

The

Cotton guaranteed equal to the sealed sample
The sealed sample was a sjnple of

in our poseession. "

*Long staple Salem cotton".

The cotton turned out when
it

landed to be not in accordance with the sam, le,

The

"Western Madras instead of *Long staple Salem'.
contract contained a clause,

being

"Should the quality prove

inferior to the guarantee a fair allowance to be made."
It

was admittad that'Western Madras'

cotton is

interior

to Long staple Salem" and requires machinery for its non
ufacture different

for that used for the Atter.

Held,

that this was mot a case of inferiority in quality, but
of difference of kind; that there was a condition preedent and not simply a warranty 2nd that the defendant
wprs not bound to accept the cotton tendered.
This ease is

apparently a doubtful one.

pinion of the Court it

In the o-

seems to be taken for granted that

t-he

what th

le".

3u0c1,

vendee bargained for was "Long stale
however,

does not oearn to have been the
;,,o particular kind

c se,,,and what he got was cotton.
of cotton -was rantione4,
that

though thet'e was a sti-.uation
True,

should be equal to a riven sample.

it

sample wa§'

Sa-

"
ongstaple Salemtl,

Lhe cotton might nave

ut

did not rappen to be

been equal to the sample though it
that !'articular br.nd,

that

ihe words "equal to" woild seem

to import quality rather than hind.

An important ele-

ment in this case and one on which it

may be distinguish-

ed is

the fact that the cotton tendered to the vendee re-

quired different machinery for its

mnufacture than Ot-

ton similar to the sample shown to him.
In
ai

Hopkins v.

Hitchcock,

N.3.,

65,

se find

apparent limitation to the rule that a misdeseription

avoids the contr act.
tiff,

14 C. B.

Hopkins & Co.,

den anA Hiopkins,

It
hL4d

appears here,
ucce';dcd to the

Iron Manfaetur:rs,

of sm-mpleing their iron";3.

34

and were informed that all

was now inarked"H & CO."

firm of Snow-

who werein the habit

with a cron.

fendants Lpjlied to lurchase "H. &
broker,

th1t the plain-

.

The de-

iron through a

iron r:rde by the firm

the defentLnts then ordered

67 tons of the iron, and the broker made the bought note

for "W' tons 11.

& Co.

delivery was marked "Hi.

defendants.

'1he iron on

& 5. crown company bars".

" and was rejected by the

The Jury found the vriation in the brand

to be of no consequence and gave a verdict for the plaintiffs.

On motion for a new trial the court refused to

set aside the verdict,

holding, that

fat;ts and circumstances of the case,

un der the special
and the

juray having

negatived that the mark was of any consequence,

the plaiR

tiffs had delivered the goods in conformity with the description in the contract.
This case contains, at leaot, a strong suggestion
that where a misdescription is such as not to materially
affect the agreement it will not avoid the contract.
must be remembered, however,
peculiar circumstances,
fenunt was aware,

that in this case there were

namely , the fact that the do-

before he purchased the iron,that the

stamp had been changed.

At the si.rne time the court

seemed to lay more stress upon the fact that the misdescription was immateriai,

than upon the fact of the de-

fendant's knowledge of tVhe chunge.
Tea

n soe o

It

tatsf

Part

the Descrip

on.

sale which cont;in

stipula-

Tiaie a Part of the D" scriptlon

In some contracts of sale which contain a stipulation that the goods are to be s'hied
time the stipulation as to the tim
of the description of the

jy

c: ses where a variatio'n in

ods.

within a certain
of Thiprment

is

a part

This is only so in

the time of shipment woidd al-

ter t-e character of' goods shirred under a certain nam;
for instance, a June shipment of apples would differ meaterially from

"

October ship;ment hot only as to the

time but as to the quality of the fruit furnished.

The

only difficulty that arises here is as to the interpretation of the expressions "to be shipi 'd' or "shipment'.
Do the- mean that the rood

shall be placed on bozaid ship

during the time specified or thlt tho shipment shall be
aompleted before the time expires?
view adopted in i;lexander v.

The latter was the

anDerzee,

T. F'.

7 C. P.

530, in which case the defendant had contricted for the
purchase of 10 000 quarters of nanubian maize for shipsent in June and (or) July.

Two cargoes wer- tendered

to defendant, the bills of lading being dated respectively the 4th and 6th of June.

The loading of the dargos

was commenced on the 12th and 16th of May and finished on
the 4th and 6th of June, more than half of each cargo
having been put on board in May.

There was evidence thitt

grain shirped in May was mnore likely to damage by heating
than grain shipped in June, but it does not appear that
any evidence of usage to affect the ordinary meaning of
the words was tendered.

At the trial it was left to the

jury to sa-° whether the cargoutin question were "June
shipments" in the ordinary business sense of the-term,
and they found that they were.
was rightly left to the jury.

Held, That the question
The words were ambig$ous

and might imean, either that the shipment was to be completed in one of those months, or' that the whole quantity of grain was to be put on bouad during these months.
In Boweo v.
tract

Shand, L.

R. 5 ,PP, *as.,

455,

the con-

was for /the sale of 600 tons Madras rice to be

shipped during the months of March and (or) April.

Bills

of lading for various portions of the rice were given
on the 23rd, 24th and 28th of February.

ip-

The last bill

of lading was given upon the,&th of March but all except
a small portion of the rtoe had been shipped in February.
In an aetion for refusing to accept the rice the defence

iatd not

was thaft it

caroh and (or)
tha't

tt,

and (or)

een shipped during the months of

o ril.

T!,ere

w~s no evidence to show

::ord2 "to be shipI; :d dur-ing7
:p'ril" had in

ho rontIr3 01' Liarch

trade any other 2i:o.n their natur-

al and ordinary me:ning; on the contrary t-,re was evidence th:.t they were used in their ordirvirix and natural
Ield, theit the natural meaning of the stipul -

sense,
tion

s t-

should be

the shipment -,;ao thoat th
Tut

whole of the rice

on board during the months mentioned' and

that, in the absence of any trade usAge to affect the
meaning of the words if wa'i for the court to construe
the icontract .

This dicision o

the l(*,us

of Lords ef-

fectually disposes of the decisions in Alexander v. Vanderzee.

Ne gt4e0e-Pape r

Comin,

the head of"sale by Kescrijtion" is

.

classof

cases in which it has been held that the vendor of bill-3
of "xchange, note , shares, crtificates, and other securities is bound, not by the collateral contr-ct of warranty, but by the principal contract itself, to deliver
as a condition precedent that which is genuine, not that

which isy±alse, oountetfeit, or not marketable by the
name or deuomination used in describing it.

(Benj. AS-

§607/.)

In Gompertz v. Bartlett, 2 E. & B. 849,.there was a
sale of n foreign hill of exchange.
the bill

was not a ftoreign bill

because not stamped.

It turned out that

-nd therefore worthless

Held that the rurchaser was enti-

tled to recover back the price because the thing sold was
not of the kind described inthe sale.

In Guerney v.

W;rmsley,

4 P. & P.,

33,

bill of

a

exchange was sold to the plaintiff on which d-l

the sig-

natures were :forged except that of the last endorser who
had forged all the precoding.

Lord Campbell,

C. J44At&

*After the repeated decisions the oouitthonght it must
be settled law, that the plaintiffs were under suah ojrcumstnces entitled to reeovor the money r&&d

On a con-

sideration'which had failed'.
Bramwell, who acted for the defendant in this case,
made strenuous efforts to distinguish it from the prooedini

cases on the ground that in thos,)v cases the thing

sold was entirely failse and worthless; whereas, in this
case the sioature

of the last indorser was genuine and

4

the billAtherefore of some valuie.

The casf.e

which he

atterapts to distinguish seam to ber him out in his di3tinction, see Jones v. Ryde, 5 Ta"nt., 486, and Young v.
Cole, 3 Ping IT. C., 274,

in both of wAhich cases the ins-

strument sold were worth no more then the Taper upon
which they were written, and in both of which the court
seems to hnvebaseA its decision on the ground that there
was a total failure of consideration.
in Young v. Cole, stys:A-

BEsanquet, J.,

' I agree in the i rinciple of

the c,-ses cited as t o breach of Varranty but this is
a case of that description.

not

Tlere no consideration has

been given for the money receted by the defendant:

the

bonds he delivered to the plaintiff were nt Guatemala
bonds but, on the stock exchange worthhess paper-*

The

court in Guerney v. Wormsloy did not however adopt Bramwell's view of these cases, nor would they h:.ve been
right in so doing.
nary

There is no doubt that in the ordi-

case of slale of good.3 or merchandise, as a cargo

6f grain or a specifieJ quantity of hops,

t,2

rood; must

answer to the description under .vrich they were sold or
the buyer has a right to reject them and rpcover back
the price, and this irrespective of the question as to
whether the goods delivered were of any v'.lue or not, *..d

and there is
eommeri1-!l
it

no good reason 31,o id not aprly to sales of

paper.

It is now s-ttled beyond doubt that

does.

Merchatibility Under Desaription

-0Mellor, J.,
says:-

in Jones v. Just, L. I. 3 Q. B., 197,

*In every contract t o supply

fied description which the buyer has

goods of a speeino opportunity to *-

spect, the goods must not only in fat answer the speelfied description but must also be merchani
able under that description."

-e or sale-

This, however, was an

action for damages for bneaeh of an implied warranty.
There is a warranty that goods shall be merahantable but
it is not a oondition precedent.
There are cases,
as Young v. Oole, and Jones,.
Ryde, supra, and

sauh

Lattimore, 9 B. & C. 259, where the goods answered to the
description but were absolutely valuelesa and in these
cases it was held that the vendee w.-s not bound to aocept the goods.

The decisions in these cases proceead

upon the theory of a total failure of consideration.
It

is

for the court to say whether the language of

the contract amounts to a description of the subject mat-

ter or not but the question as to whether or not the good
delivered answered to the description is for the Jury.
15 M. & 'i.

See hLitchell Newhall,

308, per Rolf,e.B.,

p.

310

3ale of Clrgo
-0-In the ease of the sale of a eargo question has arisen whether the delivwiry of a complete cargo is
dition precedent.

It

a con-

would seem that this would depend

largely upon the circumstances in eaih particular case,
It

does not seem as if,

in the ordintry case,

failure to

deliver a complete caroo would go to the root of the
whole agreermntp but it
where it

is

easy to conceive of a case

would.

In Kregger v. Blanok,

L.

R, b 8xo., 179,

the do-

fendant ordered of the plaintiff "A snall eargo of lathwood of about the following lengths etc.
63

in all about

cubic fathoms." and the plaintiff's accepted the order

The plaintiffs, not being able to procure a vessel of the
exact size,

chortered a vessel to the defendant's port

loaded with 8. fathoms.

On ariivul of' the vessel the

plaintiff*a agent unloaded,

measured,

and set apart tim-

ber to answer the defendant's order ,nd tendered him a

34.

bill of lading fcr that quantity, and a draft for acceptance.

Deferdant declined to accept (,n the f-round thet

the cargo was in exeess

,f the order.

Mfeld, tht *car-

go'meant the whole cardo and not a partial of' a cargo and
that plaintiffs had not complied with the order so as to
entitle them to maintain the actionS

4e

Kelly 0. B., gives the following reasons why the
stipulation for a- Ocargo" shcpId bb held to mean an entire cargo.

Ie

"There might be a general lien

says,-

for freight upon the whele eargo, which the defendant
might be eOmpaled to satisfy though interested in only
a part of the cargo.

There might be a dispute as to

the quality arising oltt of the mixture of the defendants
timber with other timber brought by the same vessel.
Part of the timber shi1ped in one entire bulk might be
lost in a storm# and the question would then arise asto
whose was the timber that was lost and whose was saved;
and, as between two dfferent

sets of underwriters which

was liable to make good the loss.'

In Borrowman v. Draytont L. RAExch. Div., 15, the
plaintiffs sold to the defendant 'a cargo of from 2500
to

000 barrels of American petroleum to be shipped from

'the f lain-

NewYork, vessel to call for orders etcu.

tiffs Oharterod a vessel, and put on board three thousand
barrels of petroleum and a b6l1 of lading wlas signed Tnaking them deliverable to the plaintiff.

,s this quanti-

ty did not eonstitute a full cargo, 300 additional bar-"
rels were placed on board which

were marked with a dif-

ferelt mark, and for which a separate bill
signed.

of lading was

Plaintiffs gave notice to the defendant of the

shipment of the 3O00 barrels and were ready to order the
vessel from its port of wall to

ony port of delivery

within fte contract, and there to deliver to the defendant the 6 000 barrels and to take the three hundred barrels themselves.

"

Defendants refUsed to accept.

iHeld,

thcft the true eonstraetion of the word cargo meant the

entire load of the vessel which carried it and that there
fore, the defendant was not bound to acaept the oil tendered •
It was said by Sir Barnes Peacock in delivering the
judgment of the court in the Colonial Ins. Co. of New
Fealand v. 1he Adelaide Marine Ins. Co., 12
lo4,

that the woild "carfow

ip. Cas.,

is a word suscI:,tible of dif-

ferent manings and must be interpreted with referenoe to
the context.

Where the sale of the oirgo is made by a bill of
lading and in the bill of lading the car,'ro is desoribed
as consict~ng of a specified quantity of r-oods^is a condition precedent to the sale thl.:L ,he

cargo shall answer

to that description.
In Tamvaco v. Lucas, I E. & E.,

581 there -was a

sale of a cargo of wheat "of about 2 000 quarters, say
from 1 800 to 2 200 quarters, seller to guarantee delivery of *nvoioed weight,
to pay for any exces:

a

accidents excepted, buyers

of weight, unless it be the result

of sea da: age or heating.

Papment cash in London in

exchange for usual shipping doauments."

Pl,.intiffs oft

fered1 defendants shipping dooumenU for a eargo of wheat
amounting to 2 215 quartars, which dofe-ldant refused to
accept.

11hen the bill of lading was tendered and the

invoice made out the vessel was at sea and naither party
knew what ,as
ment:3.

on board except from Lhe shipping doou-

When the cargo was delivered from the ship it

was found to consist of more than 18 00# and
2 200 quarters.

L-rJ.4 Carpbell C. J. :-

less than

"The eargo,

although of not an absolutely defined amount, was to be 6
betwwen 1 800 and 2 200 quarters.

We think the agree-

ment

i1;s that it

the cargo offored exceeded that quantity so that,
cepted

,

If

should not exceed that quantity.

if ac-

the sellers would have a demand on the purchaser

for payment of more than 2 200 quarters, we think that
he was not bound to accept

it.

JIt,
did not want a larger

quantity, and he could not be expecte3d to be prepared to
pay for

-larger

quantity.

On the tender to him of the

cargo by deliverpf'the usual shipping douments'

he

could not have accepted the quantity he agre.d to purchase and reject the excess.

It

seem s to us quite

clear that hh wvotld h..ve been liable to pay for the excess,

if

there had been any;

for saying that the crgo

there being no ground here

war to be taken at a fixed sum,

for better for worse; and there beinu

an express stipula-

tion thait,

by measurement

if

the quantity delivered

should suoceed the estimated weirht,
sult of sea darmge of heating,

unless from the re-

the purchaser was to pcay

the excess."
In
1)92,

another case between the same par't~es

wl E..

.,,

it was held that the vendee was not bound to accept

a cargo les.

then that describe., in

th-

,il

nf lading.

Sale by

InstalmenLs

"In determining whether stipulations as to time of
rerforming contract of sale are conditions precedent the
courts seek simply to discover what the parties really
intended, and if time appears, on a fair consideration of
the language and the circumstances, to be of the essence
Pf the contract stipulations in regard to it will be
held to be conditions precedent."
CL quest:ien which has caused

oBenjamin, Par. 593.
much trouble is whether

in a contract to deliver good s or to pay for them iniinstilmen, s, delivery of or paymnt for one instalment at
the stipulated time is a conditicn precedent.

The au-

thorities upon this point ar- numerous and conflicting
but it has at length been :;ettled by a decision in the
House of Lords.
In Hear v- Rennie, 5 H. & 1., 19, there was an agreen-ant to buy GG7 tons of iron to be shipped in about
equal portions in the months of June, July, August and
September.

The plaintiff (the vondor) shipped only 21

tons in )uzut which the defendant refused to accept.

In

an action fot the price of the iron it was held that a-

delivery at the time specified was a conditiwn rrecedent
and that the plaintif- could not on.the e facts, maintain an action agains t the defend nt for not
In Jonassor4v.

ccepting.

thle decara-

Young, 4 T. 2, 2., 29G,

tion set forth in an agreement by the defendant to purN.Gas Coals as one 4.team

chase as many o~f the plaintiffs

fetch in nine

vessel to be sent by th- defendant coul,
months.

Broach: th't the defendant refused to send a

steam-wessel 1 o fetch divorst cargoSof coal.

To this

the defendant pleaded that before any breach by the dedetaining

fendant the plaintiffs broke the cont.ract by
an unreasonable time,

and beyond the time permitted by

the contract the vessel sent by the defendnts to receive
the coal.

On demurrer,

Crompton, J.,

held,

that the plea was had.

"The vice of the Tlea is

thut the breach

poes to o.ly a part of the consideration.

The argument

for the defendant must go to this length thA

the un-

neces:"e'Y detention of the defendant's vessel fcr the

one houY would entitle him to put
In TIearzv. Rennie,

we must take it

-n end to the contract,
that time wes of' the

essence, of the contract"
In 3impson v.

Cripjin, L.

.-

8 ".

B.,

14,

the de-

fendants agreed to supply the -vaintiff with from six

thousand to eight thousand tons of coal to be delivered
into the plaintiff's wagons at the defendant's oolliert&
in equal monthly quantities durinr a period of twelve +.9
months at 5 s. 6 d. per ton.

During the first month the
Imme-

plaintiff sent wagons to receive only 158 tons.

diately after the first month had expire,] the defendants
inforrmd the plaintiffs that, as they had taken only 158
Plain-

tons, the defendants would annul the contract.

tiff'3 refused to allow the contract to be annulled, but
de9fendants declined to deliver any more coal.

Held that

the breach by tho plaintiff in taking lass than the stipulated quantity during the first month did not entitle
the defend.nts to rescind the contract.

Bl.ckburn j.:A-

"No suffivient reason has been urgeu why damages would
not be a compensation for a breach by the i'aintiff,

a

and

wA4-ethe defendant should be at liberty to annul the
contract;

but it. is said that Hoarev. Reanie is in point,

and that we ought not to go counter to the decision of a
court of co-ordinate

jurisdiction.

It

i3,

however, dif-

fivult to understand upon .hat principle iToargv.
was decided.

ennie

No rr~son has been pointed out why the de-

fendants sheuld not have delivered the stipulatod quantity of coal during each of the months after July,

although

plaintiffs in that month failed to accept the number of

Young".

Jonnssoh iv.

Mellor,

said he could not dis-

J.,

that

t inguish 11oar v. 'Fennie and 44*edAhard to reconcile
Lush,

case with some of the earlier oa:30s.
cozWd not understand the judgm elto; in

so id

J.,

time were 6f its

In 1rooth v.
contracted to sell

four weeks;

ory of each

L.

to th

7'.

9 C. P.,

plaintiff

208,

that

the defendant

250 tons of pig iron
two,

rmrnainder

payment not cash 14 ,days after the doliv-

rrel.

The market was rising, and notwith-

standing urgent demands by the plaintiff
the first

in

essence.

half Lo be delivered in

at 5,; s. per ton
In

Burr,

he

Jloar v. Eennie and

that the court nust have Anterpret!,d the contract
case as if

in

Ronnie was questionled

fHoar v.

tons contracted fr.

the deliverp of

125 tons was not cor@leted for r, early six montk

Who plaintiffs refased to lay for TIhe first

parcel,

claim.ing the right to set off the loss they had sustainid
from being obliged to procure other iron in
of the defendant's default but they still
cry of the second parcel. i, 'Ie

defend.:nt,

consequence

0

urged the doliv
treating the

refusal to pay as a breach and abandori.rn nt of the dontraet
by the plaintiffs,

refused to

deliver any more.

Held,

42.

parcel did not

that the mere refusal to pay for the first
under the circumstances,

warrant the defendant in

treat-

ing the contract as abandonmd and refusing to deliver the
Tord Coleridge,

remainder.
is

C. J.,

"The true questin

:-

whether the acts and conduct of th3 larty evinced an

intentien no longer to be bound by the contract.
non-payment

Now,

on the onv hand, or non-delivery on the other

Iftay amount to such an act,
of an intention

rholly to abandon the contract and set

the other party free.
which Hoarey.

or may be evidence for a jury

the true principle on

'ahis is

VPennie was decided,

whether rightly or not
Where

upon the facts I will not prestrae to say.

bu the

non-deliver; of part of the thing contracted for the
whole object of the contract

is

frustrated,

rnaking default renounces on his part all

the part,.

the obligation3

ol' the cont 'taet.l
In
defendrnt

r'andt v. Lawrence,

L.

R.

1 Q. B.

entered into two contracts,

for the purchase from the plaintiff

D.,

344,

the

each of which was

of 4500 quarters

Ri-ssian oats, move or less, shipment by steamer or steamebruary.
ers during ..

Plaintiff shipped in one steamer

4511 quarters to answer the first contract and 1139 quar-

43,

ters to answer in part tho second contract.

lie also

n another ,tnarmer a sufficient quantity of oa, s
sh ppe, -.
to copplete3 the second oontract.

The sh ipment on the

iivst st. mer was made on time, that on the second steamThe court held that the words

er was r!ade too late.

"by steamei or st earners" showed an inkention that the
shipment zhould be made

in different rarcels and not In

Lwo specific lots, so that the case was brought within
the principle ot Simpson v- Crippen and the defendfant wv!;
bound to accept the 11o9 quarters in part fulfilment of
the second contract.,
In Reuger v. Sala, L. R. 4 C. P. D., 239, the contra,,t was for the sale, by ihe 'lAntiff to the defendant of 25 tons Penang pepper, name of vessels
clared.

Plaintiffs declared

to be de-

25 tons by a particular v-

vessel, only 20 tons of which complied with the t.,rms of
the contract as to shipment.

It

v-s held b9t he maJor-

ity of the court that the defendants were not bound to
accept leas

thae

25

tons.

Erandt v. Lawrence was dis-

tinguished on the ground t hat in the ease tnder consideration the plaintiffs had named only one ship ,nd made
one indivisible shipment.

Brett, L. J., dissenting

principle *

"The gener"-

says:-

b

deduced from

thes3e cases is Lhat, where, in
purchase and sa le of Gooda

crc:antilo
ontract of

to be delivered

3fld accepted,

the terms of' Lhc3. contra t a.llo-Athe deliv~ry to behucesaive doliverie:3,

the f::ilure of tU

his p1,rt in

to fulfil

selilr or buyer

any one -or more of those deliveries

does not absolve the othc& I rt.

from tendering or acoepL

ing in the case of other subsequent deliveries, olthough
the contract was for the purchase and sale of a specified
quantity of good.. , and althouC,., the fsilur"i of the party
as to one or more deliveries -,,ias incurable, in the

s'-in

sense thnkt he 'could never fulfil his undertaking to accept od deliver the whole of the 73-ecified qu:ntity.
r,asons given are,
is

The

that such a breach by the plarty suing

a breaCh of only a part of the consideration moving
-rori

tha t

such ) breach can be compensated in dam-

a;;es -:ithol.'t any necessity of annuling the whole contract
that the whole con3truction of these contractfsi

that it*

is not contrary to the obligation to tender or ,,zccept a
part;

that the other rarty should hr,.vo !oon or should
4,

be,

always ready and willin

on,

,ble to aecept or tender

the whole"Ij Honek v. Muller, L. R. 7 Q. E. D.J,

92, the

de-

defendaUt

sr,ld to the plaintiff

2 00(i tose

be delivered to the ilaintiff

; d.

per ton extra.

in

January.

failed tortke

but claimed to h ve de-

refased to

thirds and rave notice that

1eld,

eliver these two

he considered that

tr.act was cncelled by the plaintiff's

In thie MIrsey Steel and Tron Co.

monthly commencing

Pennie

llalor,

(supra)
L. T.

5 000 tons steel blooms " elivery
January next,

three dV-.rs after receipt

tiff-

v.

a majority

434t the defend nts had agreed to purchase

from the plaintiff

in

iny

that the defend.nt was justi-

of the court followed td-cab:-cd T-oarev.

Gas.,

the con-

breach1 to take

fied in refusing to deliver the two t':irds.

U Ap.

,.nd

the iron in December :nd one thir)'

he defenda&A

:ron in Novemiber.

]ecember

Plaintiff

delivery of the iron in Noveonb"
livery of one third oi

iron to

f.'ee on boarl at makers

wharf in Z oven1er or equally oveiNovembe'
January -t

ig

paymont net c"sh ,rith-

oi" shipl ing documents".uPLii-

delivered part of the first

instalment b!t before

payment became due a winding up petition viz-As v~esented
and defendants, acting upon a mistake of law refused
pending the bankruptcy petition, to Tay for the steel
ready 4elivered.

l-

Plaintiffs treated the refusalx to

pay as a brea*h or the contract and refused to make fur-

ther deliveries ,jlthough the defendants were ready and
to pay for them and offered to do so.

Vfiiliw
held,
to

without a dissenting opinion,

It

vss

that the failure

1,-Y i'or the one instalment did not a void the contract

on the ground,

that such a failure only -,ent to a I art of

the consideration.

Their Loitdships intimate tLt in

or-

der to avoid the contract the conduct of the rlarty must
amount to an absolute refusal to ;,e:cform.
,.ae

effect

of this desision would seem to be that

pa~i1ent for one instaln-ent uan never be a condition precedent to the right to claim delivery of the remaining
instalments; a nd it cannot be urged with any show of reason tiut the same rule does not apply to a delivery of an
instalment of goods.
to both cases.

±he saineiriaciple is pp'licable

In both the failure goes only to a,part

of the consideration.
the-e ar2 several cases coming under the 4th of ir.
Benjamin's rules xhich require some consider.. tion.

In

.'tkinson v. Smith, 14 M & W., 61J5, there was an agreenent in the following words,'Bought of Messrs Atkinson
& Co. about thirty packs of Cheviot fleeces, and agreed
to take the under mentioned noila; also agreed to draw
for

25O on account at three inonths.

The defendant r,-

f£,sed * o deliver the noils.

Held,

that he could not r-

cover ; rithout ave4ng and -rovin- as a condition 7rece:he delivery an

dent

tender of all

ihers v. Reynolds, 2 B. : /d.,

the rleces.

In

C2, the defenda.nt a-

with straw at the rat,

to furnish the rlaintiff

of

loads a fortnight at 30 s. per lo,d for each load

thr'-

of straw delivered on his premises during a certain period.

After the .3tr-:zw had heen supplied for sorne time

the rlaintiff

refused to pay for the

and eee-i,-&e-d in

always kceping one load in

arrearS. Held,

the true int,-nt of the agreement was th ..
t each lood

tht
,zv

last load delivered

to be paid for on delivery,

tiff's

and that on the plain-

i-fus ,l to pay for them the dcfendant was not

bound to send any mori.
plaintiff

Patteison, J. :-"

the

had merely failed to pay for any partiulr

load that of itself right not

have been an excuse for

the defendant for delivering no more strew:
plaintiff

If

but the

h:,e expressly refuses to psy for -he load; ,le-

liv.red;
cea3in

,lrxi the defendi.'nt,

therefore, is not liable for

to perform his part of the contr1.ct.

The above quotation iddicates the distinction be-

tween this c.8se and others such as the hersey 3tool
Ir.on CO. v. Naylor (supra).

.rd

1ere the breaeh was not on-

lY rs to one load but the plaintiff absolu .ely and positively refused to carry out the contract according to its
tAproposeA to subhtitute

terms
In

, writt
cha;e

Pa;kart v. BoWers,

L.

K..

-,,not,,r one its
1 C.

P.

,404,

place.
there was

f agreement by which the Ilaint'iff aqroed to purcrtcin

lands and all thV

mines,

of coal etc. under the same, st

.'

threads and vein3

certain

-n
arie-;

-the def3nd:nt agreed to purch.so from the plaintiff all
toia coml that he
fir

lidit from time to time requireat a

market price.

acts.

and that

held,

that these

ere conur-rent aoe

the plaintiff could Dot maintain an ac-

tion a-ainst t-e defendant for not takring th: coal with
Lverring
.ut
perform ane or r~adines

r. Benjamin s

-"But

to perlform his

it must be borne in mind

that to entitle t he seller to rescind the contract,
alts or conduct

of the buyer murst either amount to an ex-

press re)fusal or manifost a complete inabil
form his pavt (AL' the contract.'
Pros2 r, 2J.
P.

the

k. Rer.,

P. % ..'. ,

222,

" 6- ,

to Ier-

he cites Coreoran v.

and h:loomer v.

(Benjamin on Sales

hern 3tien, L.
. L-U2,

A,).

The 5th rule given by renjamin will be found in substance in

the opinion of ;ervis, c. J.,

;n Roberts v

IBrett,

10 C, E. 561, S. C. bC
L.

ly but

-

This rule is

prietie±6tl-

,apitition of. thesaplesed underlying phinoiple
govern iing this whole j4 -±4e@
,th.t
the court will

gather the

intention of the parties from the whole instru

sent.
Effect of Part Performance

Where

condition precede nt

is broken the promis-

ee can repudiate the contract pr ovided It

has not al-

ready been partially exeduted in his favor.

But,

if

af-

ter breach the promspee continues to accept performance,
the condition lose s its effect as such and becomes a
varr!rnty in
wo.*7.

,..he sense that it

,a means of reeovering damages.

3 B.& S., 756.
S.

can be useat only ift-trhs

C. 716.

Rekn v. Burness

Park P . in Graves v. Legr 9 9xch, 709,

says that the reason for this,

"Se m

to be,

that where a person has reeived a,part of the consideration for which he entered into the a*r-ment,

it

would 6

be unjust, that because he had not the whole, he should
therefore be parmit*d to enjoy that part without either
payment or doing anything for it.

Therefore the law o-

blIges him to perform the agr ement

on his part,

leaving

him to his
in

taied

.,medy to recovpr any lamage he may heve susreceivr

not havin

the who c consideration

,i*r. ianJamin's statmont of the rule (Benjamin

iYorm

5 4) and i om the reasoning above quoted it
1ar.
be inferred th-t it
f£ri.ncr

inmmaterial whetler the p't rer-

is

relied upon to change the nature of the stipula-

tion of the relation
dent

miaht

frcm thLt of a condition prece-

Lo tha.t of a warranty or independent agreement is

accelt,x

before or after the breach of the stipulation.

It seercis more r -asonable to say, and there is authority
f r s:ying, tha.t It is only ,.-here a party

,ccepts part

performance after a breach of th-e stipulation, that he
loses his ri7,ht to r',ly

tpon the stipulation +4 P

condi-

tirn nrecedent.
In 2llan v. Topp, (" 7xch., 424, by the terms of an
indenture of apprenticeship an infrnt vas pluiced by his
fath 1, s apprentice to a mast r, described in the indenture as an"a:lctioneer, appraiser and corn flctorto learn
his :rt
to

nd with him after the manner of an apprentice

e-ve"•

coencent

After the making of the indenture and the
of the apprenticehia

qudshed the trade of corn factor;

the s

holy relin-

Whereuron the appren-

tioe absentea himself from his aster's

service.

Ifeld,

in an tction OIn the indenture by tho ri st-r ag',inst the

ff.thel for the desertion of the

that the re-

ZpT'rentice,

linquishment by the i:aster of his, trade of corn factor
aa

a good

;irswer to the action.

It was said in a later case that the

round$ for the
r

desision in the above case was that, there the plaintiff
Was to c't'tinue to do something which was to be the consideration for the performance on his part

2nd .the case

was in this manner distinguished. (White v. Eeeten, 7
. i.,

42,).

They say that" they case w,uld be differ-

ent where there Wonly a single :ct to be r,)rformed.
Thi.] may be so, for where there is but a single act to
be performed there would be a breach of condition when
one larty tendered part performnce of that act and if
the other p.,rty accepted th!t part i'erformance he would
accipt part pei fornance -. ftir breach of the.condition and
consqquently would be no lower able to Aely on the con-

dition as a condition but only as a warrant,.
v.

2cor-ill, L..2..110

.

B.,

564,

tween the plaintiff and defcnd:-nt,

In Carter

by an a7,reemn.
,±'ter

be-

statement of'

the weekly expenditure and profit of the pl intff's bus-

iness as a printer and publisher of a newspaper, it was a
agreed, that, in the event of the business bein, proved

by the, books kept by the plaintiff to realize a olear

profit or

per week us shown by the above statement,

?

dofendant should pay plaintiff Jb(O

on the 24th of ;e-

on the 24th of June, £100

aeiber, i0037, Jb0
rMast 1868, and J200

within

at Christ-

four years from the 2b th of

In oonsideration of the prmises the

December, 1867.

Plaintifr agreed to sell to the defendant ::11 the plnt
and furniture on the promises 'and the good will or the
business, with all the earnings subtequent to the Z0th of
,ecember,

IS6d,

and the house and premises then oocupied
The defendtnt on the 30th of Decem-

by the plantiff.
ber,

entered Into possession of the house with the plant

end furniture and

of the busir*ss, whiah he thenceforth

carried on until he sold it.

After the Zapse of four

years the plaintiff brought an action for the iiwtalment
and the defendant sought to set up as a defence that the
busires3 was not i,)rOwd to be worth

per week.

J7

olear profit

Held# that, asmning that this, if

the eon-

tract lad beon .r!aeexeoutory, would have bacn a oondltion peecedent,

yet the 1efendart having hald a substan-

ti.:l part of the consideration 4ould not now set up the
non perfranane aS a defence,

:ield, J., -- Ir it

be

ufed on ther part of the defendant tat If the business

only realized

1-ittperoweek it

would be unjust that he

shoUld pay tho -Irioe which was3 estimateLi ulon realization of J7

per week the prwwer is

obvious that in

terwal between the dato of the
September, unmd beforc

takin,

and the 30th o f

possessirn or within a r- a-

sonuble time he might have ascertained whether
dion which he now alleges to be precedent

have repudiated the agreement,

the condi-

wa3 c-ipable 'if

being performed or not and might as soon "certained,

the in

this wzs as-

and returned

any portion of the con$ideration which he might have received in

the roeantime.

Insteadtof i 4 w

o he entered

into possession of., ana, carried on, and sold the busi-

ness, and the fair infereonoe is,

either that he satis-

fLied himself at. 'Jae time thut in substane the condition
was cipAble -f being perZormed, or thl-t he ;7as indiffrcnt whether it

was or was -iot,

was of suffialen t value to

and that the agreement

him for other reasons as to

A.

make it

worth his while tha t it

should be performed

'd

act.ed upon.
"'We

come,

therefore,

to the conclusion that that wlh4

might have been a condition precedent has ceased to be so
by the defendant's subsequent eonduct In acoepting less
than his bargain,

if,

in

fact,

there was any substantial

IU

deficiency".

t'his language woid aeorm to sustain the positiOn
that it

is only where part performance is

accepted after

brrach thtt the condition loses its effect as suoh und
warranty.

becomes a mer-o
It

will be observed that, in the case of Glazebrook

v, Woodrow,

wais held that a stipultion in the con-

it

tract was a condition though part p.i'formance was accept-

ed before broaoh, but the question :.,.

to the ofect of

part porformaee does not seem to havo been raised

in

In Withers v. Roynolds,(Supra) there was an

that case,

acceptan oe of jart porformae before breach

for it

ap-

pears that some of tbo straw had been delivered msd paid
for before any dispute arose.
Where the Property Passes

1hre,

in a contrivet of sale the goods are speoifio

and the property passes a stipulation with respect to the
quality or description of the goods
a warmanty.

Where,

goods in generAe

will be hold to be

on the other hand,

the sale is

of

and the property does not pass such a

stipulation may be he144a Oondition.

In Street v.

& A., 45iG, it

lay, 2 1;,.

was hold that

whero a porson b-ouGht a horse warranted suund,

again and then repurc)ased it,
of

sold it

he could not by reason

tnOa!nnoss resist an action by the origina1 vendor

for the price.

Lord Tenterden C. J.,

Juainent of the coiurtsaid-

"It

in delivering the

is not necessary to de-

cide vihether in any case the purohuser of a qeoi~ri
chattel, vho, having, 'ad an
his JdtIgrrnt upon it,
that it

opportunity of exeroising

has bourht

t, with the

uranty

is of any y.artiaula-r quality or description,

actually acceptud and ,'reqeived it
c n a Lerwards,

and

into his possession,

ipon disaoverinj, that the wqrranty has

not boen complied witht of

is own will only, orihout the

conaoulence ol' the other contr1oting party, return the

aht-L1 LO tote vendor., and exonertte himself from the AW
nat r.T the price,

on the ground that he has never re-

ceivod LILIL articlo Which he stipulated to purchase.
i-oe is indeod autlority
in th

for that position,

mese of Curtis v. Hanni;,y, ':isp

is rported to.,h:!ve said, that 'he took it
law,

P. C

Lord 2di'
,6

to be cear

Lhat if . Person puiohases a horse that is warranted

sound, and it afterward turns oUL that thG horse was un-.
sound al, the t ie

of thc, waxTanty, the buyer might,

if he

keep the horse and bring an action on the 'war-

pleased,

ranty in which he would have a right to recover the diferenoe between the value of a sound horse andane with
such defects as existed at the tiM

lhl waZTantY; or

of

he fight return the borse and bring an action to recover

the full mlay

l.aid; but in the latter ease,

Lhe seller

had a right to expect that the horse should be returned
in the same state he was when sold, and not by any means
and le proceeds

ished in value',

diii

a worse sliape

were in

Lhan it

would have boon if

imediately arter the discovery,
no defence
IL is to
it

returned

the purchaser would have

to an action for the pries of'the

article.

be implied that he would have a defence

were returned in

it

to say that if

the same state, ."d

in

in

ease

a reasonable

time after the discovery.
"'It

is extwmaely difficult,

indeed impostible to rec-

oncile thia doctrine with those cases in which it has
been held, that where the property in a specific chattel
j s

he is

.ssed te the ve*Wee, and the price has been p id,
no right* upon the breach oX the warranty,

to re-

turn the article and revest the propert. in the vendor,
and recover the price as money paid on a consideration

which Ies '£i1ed,

but must sue upon the warranty, unless

there huts beena' oonditi(on in th

contract authorizirZ

the rottirn, or the vendor has received back the titls,

or : a

and iv.,s thereby consented to rescind tie contracL,

been guilty' of fraud which d1stroys the contract altogether.
1

Weston-i v.
!6t; .ayne
P.

,

Wells,

o

Downs,
v.

hihale,

7

As to :,I $&le,

22, Towers v.

ast,

24 n. and Emnnuel v.

wherethe same dotrine

titled

I Doug7.

2'/4;

Dano,

Power v.

Z Campb., 29

was aj plied to an oxch...ngeow
v tit"

for another received.

rightly decided,

a

and the vendee held not to be en-

to sue in t'vOver forv t.o chattel deliveredb,

of barter,

Earrett

If

and we think t

ly have been always act-d upon,

is

au:d they certain-

clear thait thl

chaser o n not by his own acts 31one Unless
eepted cases abo-e -entioned,

in t}'h

purex-

rewest the Froperty 'in

seller, and recover the price when r& id,
the total failure of considoration;

and it

low that he cannot by the "same means,

v;ay

theac cases are

nro,
Ae
it

b

the

6n the round bf
seem s to fol-

protect hi.mself

from the payment on the s'me ground.
It

is

to be observed,

speoiife chattel,

thA althoak.;;h the vendee of a

delivered with a warranty, M 7 not have

a right to return it,

the same re'ason does not apply to

cases r-f executory contracts,

stance,

wher-

an article,

pose ird te

. certain quality,

for a certain pur-

or fit

never completely ac-

-..rticle sent as such is

In this and s6-

copted as such by the party ordering it.
,imilt-w

as soon as he dis-

may return it

thetttter

c iue

in-

who contracts it

is orderred from a manufacturer,

sh!,ll be of

for

covers the defeat, provided he han done nothing more in
the meantime th§ n was necessrary to give it

a fair trial,

107; nor would the

Okoll v. Jmith, 1 Stark.,

N. P. C.,

purchaser of a cmodity,

to be afterwards delivered ac-

cordingr
rm-

be boun4 to receive the bulk,

to srple,

nor after havinm received what

not a'vre^. with it;

,7-s tenr_1red and
the 2 rtple,

llivered as beinr, in

will he

wiah

eccordanoe

with

he precluded by the simple receipt

Prom betturninp the article within a reasonable time for
thi

pi-pO,ie of examination and comparison.

v-tions above stated are,intended to
of a certain specific
venree and the

tirely veet

The obsor-

rpply to the parchase

chattelaesepted and received by the

roperty in

which is

completely and en-

in him 00

The decision In

e*yworth v. Hutchinson, L. R. 2 Q.

'9.

:eoO ':j to ieavs it

*

is

not neoesaartly a warranty in

the roods a-e slecific,

goods ar

open to €o;,bt whetdr a stip-

zuid no

only in

the defendiats boujht t of whe plaintiff

L:

be trans-shipj ed in,

sallnijo
vL.4.,

-iges

,rice

Lii; .elling

,ny 8*spuLe arises it

o

,l

tLis

'Xe

larned,

or any vesse! thaj

broker's posse-

shall be decided by the

brokers viise decisit;n shall be final"
the

On arz'i-

turned out not about equal to sLmrpJIe

it

arid the br okurs -x'ter

t±i!,,t the doferd int
Of th

at a

in

The wool to bo ruarrantead to

be about equal to samples in
ion and if

cz~ae., where the

;::assos.

aslieoiric and the properLit

"4 ,bAle:
or wool to arrive ex

:J.1 cases w.here

protost f£rom the dei'endant,
aliould Lake it

awarded

a aCerftain abatem'ent

price of dileVerent balas.

It

'ivs held Lt1uL tle

Ilaendant oo;41d not reject the wool on aeoeunt oJ

its in-

.,i,'ioritj bit was bound to t&,e iL aocordine to the oonditions of the broker's award.

"The

this contract il

wool to arr ive by a

marked,

J.,

terms oi' the e nLraot seera to me -Croe from any r-a-

,3onablo doibt.
ic

Cookbu.n4, ('

so as to I-,'evcri

,.t

for L-je sIaleJ

iou.ar

r;p

salf-

siJi; tico; are ear-

the cntracL ap, lyin! to any

other wool; and the- arao guaranteod

-

about similar to sam-

If the matter stood there,

ples.

specific goods,

thia -oinq the sale of

t~hOUgh with a warranty, there would not

be tiny Yiight or power on the p:rt of th-) buyer to reject
the goods on the p

4 of their not being aonforrnable to

saplesj, but the buyer's remady would be either by aressaction on the warranty or by giving the inferiority in
evidence in reduction of damnages.

1here is nothing in*

the contraot to impott a condition that the buyer shall
be at liberty to
sample".

rejest the wools if not about similar to

*

Blaokburn, J.:-

eThe contract relates to the par-

tioular bales of wool speified and to t"!oso only and the
additional clause, that the contract is to be off if the
bales are previously sold in'4l'ew York, shews that the comtract is confined to this particular hoargro.

Then the

wools are, 'guaranteed about similar to samples'.
such a clause may be a simple guarantee or warranty,
it ni;;Y be a eandition,

Generally speaking, when thi

tract iS as to any fsoods such is a
osene of the ontraot.

Now
or
coa-

condition roing to th.

i-ut when the carntract As as to

s8POi'ic go4s, th' 0AI use is only coll:.-teral to the contraCt and Is th,- oubjeat of a cross action, or matter in
reduition, of damages.'

'T'ho observations above
czSe

thf

heen decided upon another point entirely# but,

h"vinV

even

,ro rerely dieta,

quoted

ssuch, if they embody a correct exposition of the
should be, they !re entitled to rteiht in

I-S) it

spite ,f the fact tihat thewr rte directly opposed to the
principles laid down in a prior ca3e.
T.he question then is whether or not the view adopt-

Iearied judges who decided Tsayorth v* Hutehin-

ed by th

.5on i: correct, or whether th-'. true rule is

that AnmO-m

sed in Street v. Elay.
It

is

hard to understand why there should be any

distinction upon this point between the cases where specific rgood:

are. sold and those trher

reno.'t-,.esp-cially in otstes where,
4

specific,

, ood; are sold -in
nlthoigh the goods

the vendee has had no opportunity of in-

spectinr them and some tct remains to be donm

before the

•raperty passes.
The rt le that a stipulntion as to specific goods the
property in which h s passed cannot be a cndition would
seem to beibut a lor7io-.l consequence of
that khere a pmoty has accepted

. doctrine

rart
r
y erformance of a

contract after a breach of a Ocndition the condition
aoas*s toL be available as such and beco,,ee a mere warra-*,.

The vendee,

onco the property h:as paaed,

the

oods.

anco

on hia r-art,

passing of the pror -'ty itnt !ies

'he

If

accept-

the gooda whon he acceptecd theri,

did noL covrespond to sample
ceptedl t

cannot rejoct

or description,

'-.

has ac-

%,m
aftor a breach of thz3 stipulation and there-

fore the stipulation is

no longer available as a oondi-

tion buL nmerely as a warrantyo
It would follow naturally from this thut

in all cas-

es 4herz the property has passed th2 stil-ulations must
be regarded simply as warranties,

for instanuoe wheri.

the

property p,-ses by selection and appropriation by the

It
son is

is

Impossible to find a s'ingle case a:here any rea-

given why,

atipU.lati(,ns

merely bec.iuse thd goods

ro specific,

in respect to them must be considered

-s

wi.rranties an.,it seems equally impossible to conceive of
any good reason why this sh'uld be so.
ficult to conceive of any

good r

be aun,, distinction between ti

it

is

also dif-

ason v:ic, th-.re should

c:.se whero

goods are
n.e

specific and the property, t'2sses and thatL ',whoro the Moods
are aold in

genere and the propert-.-

sss.

In

th,? one

case the vendee has had an opporttmity to inspect the
goods

himself;

in

the other,

if

he hes not delegated

Lo the vendor, he
& icit h2S to insroct the
ind the poro.tyr
n t em iill not pas
until he

that rirht

roods

hues hatd an ou
port'nity

to exercise tn;t

Yithi I' O p C t,

t) the se Lw&(: vulus-

now.,

t>: t 4,>OVC

accepted afteor brtm...ch of ,Ii,

For:t Perfarnn nca

cr'ndi-

:.

tic"', tho condition loses it
-aty,nd.,

a moe

viTt.

offoct vs 32'chi ."tnd bOCO-OS

hn t hus, boon :ointod ott aS bein

conseq unce of the

J. O
above rule,

re tOn,

nt

goods are ascertained and thQ propurty pa ,sea thereM
only a warranty--

saveral cases w>±ch rcquir-

Q-' these is

On

explanaticn.
iii),

the ," arc

in Wi}ich case,

,oslija.g !

but for a broach of
oxtie nutlur

though the i,'oVorty in

which

this case

rof

Vc

a,
. t

e,'fo,n

c

been
cd aelivered.
snn,-er yuan v.

the goods wrro

Still the vcnd,
pice.

go.ots h.od

th

The only re'e;sonable

1oe v ntraot.
is

ito,

nndcr hn

tha;t as timj

doliverdd oxrlic. acid thep, i.d novox

gooe

nvsi'ord (tp-

1

the venLIeo recovore-%d, not for a bronch of warr'a4l;

pass od,

,100

ia

oo
of t hpar

been iny rperform-

ntru. ct

&thouh ,o.e

This is tho only
(suyra),

7

rolnd upon

can be [tpl]?d,

3 r' lcific atnd tin joro

nver

fo r

tile--

trty iu:'d p.zssed -,nd

successfully defended an action tor the

This could only be on the ground that,

as the

04

vendee had contaoi
sulphured hlops,

a very dji'Pirent article as t 7o evidenoe

ahowed, the eitr.ct

dor.

:d for unsulphiurod hois and,

nevr had bern fulfilled b

the Vr-

